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ABSTRACT
Groups of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) can back each other to obtain loans from banks and
thus form guarantee networks. If the loan repayment of a small company in the network defaults,
its backers are required to repay the loan. Therefore, risk over networked enterprises may cause
significant contagious damage. In real-world applications, it is critical to detect top vulnerable nodes
in such complex financial network with near real-time performance. To address this challenge, we
introduce VulnDS: a top-k vulnerable SME detection system for large-scale financial networks, which
is deployed in our collaborated bank. First, we model the risks of the guaranteed-loan network by a
probabilistic graph, which consists of the guarantee-loan network structure, self-risk probability for
the nodes and diffusion probability for the edges. Moreover, to identify the vulnerable enterprises, we
propose a sampling-based approach with tight theoretical guarantee. Novel optimization techniques
are developed in order to scale for large networks. We conduct extensive experiments on 3 real
financial datasets, in addition with 5 large-scale benchmark networks. The evaluation results show
that the proposed method can achieve up to 100x speedup ratio compared with baseline methods. Case
studies are further conducted in the deployed system to demonstrate the effectiveness of proposed
model.
Keywords Graph mining · Risk control · Networked loan
1 Introduction
Network-guaranteed loan (also known as guarantee circle) is a widespread economic phenomenon in Asia countries,
and attracting increasing attention from the banks, financial regulatory authorities, governments, etc. In order to obtain
loans from banks, groups of small and medium enterprises (SMEs) back each other to enhance their financial security.
When more and more enterprises are involved, they form complex directed-network structures [1]. Figure 1 illustrates a
guaranteed-loan network consisting of around 3, 000 enterprises and 7, 000 guarantee relations, where a node represents
a small or medium enterprise and a directed edge from node A to node B indicates that the enterprise A guarantees
another enterprise B.
The existing mechanism in the financial industry for loan decision-making falls behind the demand for loans from
businesses. Most of the criteria are designed for independent major players, while, in practice, the small and medium
enterprises may provide inaccurate or manipulated data and induce intertwined risk factors [2]. Thousands of guaranteed-
loan networks of different complexities have coexisted for a long period and have evolved over time. This requires an
adaptive strategy in order to prevent, identify and dismantle systematic crises.
Motivation. Highlighted by the complex background of the growth period, the structural adjustment of the pain period
and the early stage of the stimulus period, structural and deep-level contradictions have emerged in the economic
development system. Many kinds of risk factors have emerged throughout the guaranteed-loan network that might
accelerate the transmission and amplification of risk. The guarantee network may be alienated from the “mutual aid
group” as a “breach of contract”. An appropriate guarantee union may reduce the default risk, but significant contagious
damage throughout the networked enterprises may still occur in practice [3]. The guaranteed loan is a debt obligation
promise. If one corporation gets trapped in risks, it may spread the contagion to other corporations in the network.
When defaults diffuse across the network, a systemic financial crisis may occur. Therefore, it is critical to consider
the contagion damage in the guaranteed-loan networks. Moreover, it is desirable to efficiently identify the k most
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Figure 1: A real-world guaranteed-loan network, where each node represents an enterprise and each directed edge
denotes a loan guarantee relation.
vulnerable nodes (i.e., enterprises with high default risks) such that the banks or the financial regulatory authorities
can pay extra attention to the purpose of financial risk management, which is more urgent than ever before with the
slowdown of the economics worldwide nowadays.
In the literature, some advanced approaches (e.g., [4]) have been proposed to predict the default risk of an enterprise
in guaranteed-loan network, in which its profiles, as well as the context of the node (i.e., enterprise), are carefully
considered. For instance, a high-order and graph attention based network representation methods have been designed
in [4] to infer the possibility of loan default events. These approaches indeed consider the structure of the guaranteed-loan
network. However, they cannot properly capture the uncertain nature of the contagion behavior in the networks.
Our Approach. In this paper, we introduce VulnDS: a top-k vulnerable SME detection system for large-scale financial
networks, which is deployed in our collaborated bank. In particular, we model the risks of the guaranteed-loan network
with probabilistic graph model, and infer the default probability of a node following the possible world semantics [5],
which has been widely used to capture the contagion of the network in practice. In particular, as shown in Figure 2, we
use a probabilistic guaranteed-loan network with two types of probabilities to model the occurrence and prorogation
of the default risks in the guaranteed-loan network. Specifically, for each enterprise node A, we use ps(A) to denote
the learned default probability of A without considering the contagion damage, namely self-risk probability. For each
guarantee relation A → B, we use p(B|A) to denote the likelihood that B defaults in case of A’s default, namely
diffusion probability. Note that we can obtain the self-risk probabilities and diffusion probabilities based on the existing
works (e.g., [6, 4]).
Figures 2(a) and (e) illustrate the structure of a toy probabilistic guarantee loan network with 5 enterprise and 6
guarantee relations, as well as the associated self-risk probabilities and diffusion probabilities. Given the probabilistic
graph G, we may derive the default probability of a node following the possible world semantics, where each possible
world (i.e., instance graph in this paper) corresponds to a subgraph (i.e., possible occurrence) of G. Figures 2(b)-(d)
denote three example possible worlds of the graph in Figure 2(a). In each possible world, a node (i.e., enterprise) exits
if it defaults, and an edge A→ B appears if the default of A indeed leads to the default of B. Taking the node E as an
example, it may default because of (i) itself, which is represented by a shaded node as shown in Figure 2(b), or because
of (ii) the contagion damage initiated by other nodes as shown in Figures 2(c)-(d). In Section 2, we introduce how to
derive default probabilities of the nodes (i.e., SMEs) given the probabilistic guaranteed-loan network.
In this paper, we show that the problem of calculating the default probability of a node alone is already #P-hard, not
mentioning the top-k vulnerable nodes computation problem. A straightforward solution for the top-k vulnerable nodes
computation is to enumerate all possible worlds and then aggregate the results in each possible world. However, this is
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Figure 2: A toy example of probabilistic guaranteed-loan network.
computational prohibitive as the number of possible worlds of a probabilistic guaranteed-loan network may be up to
2n+m, where n and m are the number of nodes and edges in the graph, respectively. In this paper, we first show that we
can identify the top-k nodes by using a limited number of sampled instance graphs with tight theoretical guarantees. To
reduce the sample size required and speedup the computation, lower/upper bounds based pruning strategy and reverse
sampling method are developed. In addition, to further accelerate the computation, a bottom-k sketch based method is
proposed.
Contributions. The principle contributions of this paper are summarized as follows.
1. We advocate the problem of top-k vulnerable nodes detection in guaranteed-loan networks, which is essential
in the financial risk management. We propose a probabilistic guaranteed-loan network model to capture the
contagion damage among the networked-guaranteed loans properly.
2. We develop effective lower and upper bound techniques to prune the searching space and reduce the sample
size required. Advanced sampling method is designed to speed up the computation with the rigorous theoretical
analysis.
3. To further accelerate the search, a bottom-k sketch based approach is proposed, which can greatly speedup the
computation and return a competitive result.
4. We conduct extensive experiments to evaluate the efficiency and scalability of our proposed algorithms on 3
real financial datasets and 5 benchmark networks. The evaluation results show that the proposed method can
achieve up to 100x speedup ratio compared with the baseline method. In addition, through the experiments
on a real-life financial dataset, it verifies that our proposed probabilistic guaranteed-loan network model can
significantly improve the prediction accuracy.
5. The proposed techniques are integrated into our current loan risk control system, which further demonstrates
the advantage of our proposed methods.
Roadmap. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the problem studied and the related
techniques used in the paper. Section 3 shows the basic sampling-based method and our optimized algorithms. We
report the experiment results in Section 4, and case studies in Section 5. We present the related work in Section 6 and
conclude the paper in Section 7.
2 Preliminaries
In this section, we first introduce the business procedure for the construction of guaranteed-loan network. Then we
present some key concepts in the context of our methods as well as a formal description of our top-k vulnerable nodes
detection problem for networked-guarantee loans. Finally, we introduce the related techniques used.
2.1 Business Procedure
In order to obtain a loan, a borrower needs to open an account and provide detailed information to the bank. Banks
assess the loan application by rule checking and grant evaluation. Normally, the bank may be reluctant to issue the
loan to SMEs, as it is difficult for small businesses to meet the bank’s lending criteria, which are designed for scale
companies. There is something of a blank area for setting the criteria for SMEs due to the lack of security. However,
they are permitted to offer other corporations as an endorsement. Usually, banks need to collect as much fine-grained
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Figure 3: Business procedure of loan management.
information as possible to make the decision, including transaction information, customer information, asset information
such as mortgage status, and history of loan approval.
As shown in Figure 3, if one or multiple guarantors back the loan, the bank then processes the application in a pre-loan
risk assessment system and issue the loan to the borrower if passed. Afterwards, the borrower is expected to repay the
interests and principal (or partial) regularly according to the loan contract. If the borrower fails to repay, its guarantors
are obligated to pay the rest part of the loan, which is illustrated in the dashed line. The bank regularly conducts a
post-loan risk assessment for all issued loans. In this procedure, our proposed VulnDS plays a vital role in the risk
control of loans, which is proceeded in both the pre-loan assessment and post-loan control. The detected risk loans will
be alarmed and escalated to responsible account managers and risk managers for the appropriate measures to be taken.
2.2 Key Concept
Definition 1 (Guaranteed-loan Network (GN)). A guaranteed-loan network (GN) is defined as a directed graph
G = (V, E), where each node is a small or medium enterprise (SME). For each e ∈ E , the direction is from the
warrantor to the borrower.
Definition 2 (Self-risk Probability). Given a gu- aranteed-loan network G = (V, E), we define the default probability
of a node vi ∈ V , which is caused by self factor, as self-risk probability ps(vi).
Definition 3 (Diffusion Probability). Given a gu- aranteed-loan network G = (V, E), if a node vi provides warrant to
another node vj , vi has the obligation to repay the loans in case of vj defaults. Thus, the diffusion probability of vi
caused by vj is defined as p(vi|vj):
In this paper, we assume the self-risk probabilities and diffusion probabilities are readily available. Please refer to our
previous studies in [6, 4] if readers are interested in how to derive these probabilities. Then we have the definition of
probabilistic guaranteed-loan network as follows.
Definition 4 (Probabilistic GN). A probabilistic g- uaranteed-loan network G = (V, E ,P) is a guaranteed-loan
network G = (V, E) equipped with self-risk probability for each node and diffusion probability for each edge, where P
denotes the corresponding probability.
For simplicity, when there is no ambiguity, we use network, guaranteed-loan network and probabilistic guaranteed-loan
network interchangeably. In this paper, we derive the default probability of a node by considering both self-risks
probability and diffusion probability, which is formally defined as follows.
Definition 5 (Default Probability). Given a network G = (V, E ,P), for each node v ∈ V , its default probability,
denoted by p(v), is obtained by considering both self-risks probability and diffusion probability in P . p(v) can be
computed as follows.
p(v) = 1− (1− ps(v))
 ∏
all x∈N(v)
(1− p(v|x)p(x))
 (1)
where N(v) is collection of nodes who are guaranteed by v, i.e., in-neighbors of v in the network.
It is easy to verify that the equation above is equal to aggregate the probability over all the possible worlds, i.e.,
p(v) =
∑
W∈W
p(W )× IW (v)
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whereW is the set of all possible world, p(W ) is the probability of a possible world W and IW (v) is an indicator
function, which denotes if v defaults in W or not.
2.3 Problem Definition
In this work, we aim to identify the top-k vulnerable nodes, i.e., the nodes with high default probability. These nodes
are in a high level risk of loan default. While there are many classification based methods that can be used to predict
default probability (e.g., [4]), they often need to retrain model to fit distribution shift or suffer from efficiency issues.
The problem is essential in real scenarios, because we observe that the risk of guarantee loan changes frequently and
over 60% of them remains unsupervised once the loan issues. Thus, it is desirable that the top-k vulnerable SMEs can
be accurately and efficiently located.
Input. The input is a probabilistic guaranteed-loan network G = (V, E ,P).
Output. The output of our method is the set R of identified top-k vulnerable nodes, i.e., k nodes with the highest
default probability, which may cause delinquent loans in the next time window. In our scenario, we have the first-hand
real defaulted nodes in loan record system.
Objective. We have two objectives: 1) the method should be efficient, 2) while maintain competitive accuracy.
Problem Hardness. According to Theorem 1, it is #P-hard to compute the default probability p(v).
Theorem 1. It is #P-hard to compute the default probability.
Proof. We show the hardness of the problem by considering a simple case, where the self-risk probability ps(v) equals
1 for node v, and ps(u) equals 0 for u ∈ V \ v. Therefore, for the node u ∈ V \ v, the default probability p(u) is only
caused by the default of node v. Then the default probability of p(u) equals the reliability from v to u, which is #P-hard
to compute [7]. Thus, it is #P-hard to compute the default probability. The theorem is correct.
2.4 Bottom-k Sketch
In this section, we briefly introduce the bottom-k sketch [8, 9], which is used in our BSRBKframework to obtain the
statistics information for early stopping condition. Bottom-k sketch is designed for estimating the number of distinct
values in a multiset. Given a multiset A = {v1, v2, · · · , vn} and a truly random hash function h, each distinct value vi
in the set A is hashed to (0, 1) and h(vi) 6= h(vj) for i 6= j. The bottom-k sketch consists of the k smallest hash values,
i.e., L(A) = {h(vi)|h(vi) ≤ L(A, k) ∧ vi ∈ A}, where L(A, k) is the k-th smallest hash value. So the number of
distinct value can be estimated with k−1L(A,k) . The estimation can converge fast with the increase of k, where the expected
relative error is
√
2/pi(k − 2) and the coefficient variation is no more than 1/√k − 2. To distinguish from the k in the
top-k problem, hereafter in this paper, we use bk to denote the parameter k in the bottom-k sketch.
3 Ours Approaches
In this section, we first present the basic sampling method. Then, we introduce the optimized methods to accelerate the
processing.
3.1 Basic Sampling Approach
Due to the hardness of computing the default probability, in this section, we propose a sampling based method. Rigorous
theoretical analysis about the sample size required is conducted in order to bound the worst case performance.
3.1.1 Sampling Framework
To compute the default probability, we can enumerate all the possible worlds and aggregate the results. However, the
possible world space is usually large in size. Sampling based methods are widely adopted for this case. That is, we
randomly select a set of possible worlds and take the average value as the estimated default probability. By carefully
choosing the sample size, we can return a result with performance guarantee.
Algorithm 1 shows the details of the basic sampling based method. The input is a given network, where each node/edge
is associated with a self-risk/diffusion probability. In each iteration, we generate a random number for each node to
determine if it defaults by itself or not (Lines 4-7). Then we conduct a breath first search from these nodes, i.e., hv = 1,
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Algorithm 1: Basic Sampling Approach
Input : G : a given network, k: a positive integer, t: sample size
Output:R: collection of top-k vulnerable nodes
uv := 0 for all nodes v ∈ V ;1
for i in 1 to t do2
hv := 0 for all nodes v ∈ V;3
for each v ∈ V do4
generate a random number rv in [0, 1];5
if rv 6 ps(v) then6
hv := 1;7
Q ← {v|hv = 1} ;8
mark V \ Q as unvisited ;9
while Q 6= ∅ do10
vq ← Q.pop() ;11
for each va ∈ N(vq) do12
if va is unvisited then13
generate a random number re in [0, 1] ;14
if re > p(va|vq) then15
continue ;16
hva := 1 ;17
mark va as visited ;18
push va to Q ;19
for each v ∈ V do20
vc := vc + hv ;21
R ← the top-k nodes ordered by pv = vc/t ;22
return R23
Algorithm 2: Lower Bound Algorithm
Input : G : a given network, z: the order of bound
Output: pl(v): the lower bound of default probability
for i in 1 to z do1
if i = 1 then2
p(v) := ps(v);3
continue;4
for each v in V do5
calculate p(v) by equitation 1 ;6
pl(v) := p(v) for all nodes v ∈ V;7
return pl(v) for v ∈ V8
to locate the nodes that will be influenced by them in the current simulation. For each encountered edge, we generate
a random number to decide if the propagation will continue or not. For each node, the number of default times is
cumulated in Lines 21. The final default probability is calculated by taking an average over the cumulated value vc.
Finally, the algorithm returns k results with the largest estimated value.
3.1.2 Sample Size Analysis
For sampling based methods, a critical problem is to determine the sample size required in order to bound the quality of
returned result. In this section, we conduct rigorous theoretical analysis about the sample size required. Specifically, we
say an algorithm A is (, δ)-approximation if the following conditions hold.
Definition 6 ((, δ)-approximation). Given an appr- oximation algorithm A for the top-k problem studied, letR be the
set of k nodes returned by A. P k is default probability of the ranked k-th node in the the ground truth order. Given
, δ ∈ (0, 1), we say A is (, δ)-approximation ifR fulfills the following conditions with at least 1− δ probability.
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1) For v ∈ R, p(v) ≥ P k − ;
2) For v /∈ R, p(v) < P k + .
If an algorithm A is (, δ)-approximation, it means that, with high probability, (i) the default probabilities of returned
nodes are at least P kv − ; (ii) for the nodes not in R, their default probabilities are at most P k + . To derive the
sample size required, we use the following inequality.
Theorem 2 (Hoeffding Inequality). Given a sample size t and  > 0, let pv be the unbiased estimation of p(v), where
pv =
1
t
∑t
i=1 p
i
v and p
i
v ∈ [ai, bi]. Then we have
Pr[pv − p(v) ≥ ] ≤ exp(− 2t
22∑t
i=1(a
i − bi)2 ) (2)
Based on the Hoeffding inequality, we have following theorem hold.
Theorem 3. Given the sample size t,  > 0 and two nodes u, v ∈ V , if p(v)− p(u) ≥ , then
Pr[pu − pv > 0] ≤ exp(−t2/2)
Proof. We have
Pr[pu − pv > 0]
≤ Pr[pu − pv ≥ p(u)− p(v)− ]
= Pr[pu − pv − (p(u)− p(v)) ≥ ]
≤ exp(− 2t
22∑t
i=1 2
2
)
= exp(−t2/2)
The last 2 steps take pu−pv as the estimator of p(u)−p(v) and piu−piv ∈ [−1, 1]. Then we can feed into the Hoeffding
inequality and obtain the result.
Theorem 4 shows that, Algorithm 1 is (, δ)-approximation if the sample size is no less than Equation 3.
Theorem 4. Algorithm 1 is (, δ)-approximation if the sample size is no less than
t =
2
2
ln
k(n− k)
δ
(3)
where n is the number of nodes, i.e., |V|.
Proof. Suppose we sort the nodes based on their real default probabilities, i.e., {v1, v2, ..., vn}. Then we show the two
conditions in (, δ)-approximation hold if we have pvi − pvj > 0 with p(vi)− p(vj) ≥  for 1 ≤ i ≤ k < j ≤ n. (i)
For a node v ∈ R, if p(v) < P k −  < p(vi)− , it means pvi − pv > 0 for i ∈ [1, k]. Therefore, v will not be selected
intoR, which is contradict to the assumption. Thus, the first condition holds. (ii) For v /∈ R, if v does not belong to
the top-k result, the second condition holds naturally. Otherwise, there must be a node u that does not belong to the
top-k result being selected intoR. If p(v) ≥ P k +  ≥ p(u) + , it means pv − pu > 0. Therefore, v should also be
selected into the top-k, which is contradict to the assumption. Thus, the second condition holds.
Theorem 3 shows the theoretical result of bounding the order of a pair of nodes. Since 1 ≤ i ≤ k < j ≤ n, we need to
bound the order of k(n− k) pairs of nodes. By applying union bound and Theorem 3, we have
δ = k(n− k) exp(−t2/2)
⇒t = 2
2
ln
k(n− k)
δ
Therefore, the theorem is correct.
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Algorithm 3: Upper Bound Algorithm
Input : G : a given network, z: the order of bound
Output: pu(v): the upper bound probability of each node
for i in 1 to z do1
for each vertex v in V do2
if i = 1 then3
for each vs connected to v do4
p(vs) := 1 ;5
calculate p(v) by Equitation 1 ;6
pu(v) := p(v) for all nodes v ∈ V;7
return pu(v) for v ∈ V8
Algorithm 4: Candidate Reduction
Input : pu(v)/pl(v): upper and lower bound for each node, k: a positive integer
Output: B: candidates selected, k′: the number of nodes verified
Tl ← the k-th largest value in pl(v) ;1
Tu ← the k-th largest value in pu(v) ;2
B := ∅; k′ = 0 ;3
for each v in V do4
if pl(v) ≥ Tu then5
k′ ++;6
insert v into the result set;7
continue;8
if pu(v) ≥ Tl then9
push pu(v) into B ;10
return B and k′11
3.2 Optimized Sampling Approach
Based on Theorem 4, Algorithm 1 can return a result with tight theoretical guarantee. However, it still suffers from
some drawbacks, which make it hard to scale for large networks. Firstly, to bound the quality of returned results, we
need to bound the order of k(n− k) node pairs. The node size n can be treated as the candidate size, which is usually
large in real networks. Therefore, if we can reduce the size of n (i.e., reduce candidate space) and k (i.e., verify some
nodes without estimation), then the sample size can be reduced significantly. Secondly, in each sampled possible world,
we only need to determine whether the candidate node can be influenced or not, i.e., compute hv . If the candidate space
is greatly reduced, the previous sampling method may explore a lot of unnecessary space.
According to the intuition above, in this section, novel methods are developed to derive the lower and upper bounds of
the default probability, which are used to reduce the candidate space. In addition, a reverse sampling framework is
proposed in order to reduce the searching cost.
3.2.1 Candidate Reduction
To compute the lower and upper bounds of the default probability, we utilize the equation in default probability
definition, i.e., Equation 1. The idea is that the default probability for each node is in [ps(v), 1] if no further information
is given. By treating each node’s default probability as ps(v) and 1, we can aggregate the probability over its neighbors
to shrink the interval based on Equation 1. Then, with the newly derived lower and upper bounds for neighbor nodes, we
can further aggregate the information and update the bounds. The details of deriving lower and upper bounds are shown
in Algorithms 2 and 3. The algorithms iteratively use the lower and upper bound derived in the previous iteration as the
current default probability. The order of bound denotes the number of iterations conducted. It is easy to verify that
larger order will lead to tighter bounds. Users can make a trade-off between the efficiency and the tightness of bounds.
Given the lower bound and upper bound derived, we can filter some unpromising candidates and verify some candidates
with large probability. Lemma 1 shows the pruning rules to verify and filter the candidate space.
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Lemma 1. Given the upper and lower bounds derived for each node, let Tl and Tu be the k-th largest value in pl(v)
and pu(v), respectively. Then, we have
1) For u ∈ V , u must be in the top-k if pl(u) ≥ Tu.
2) For u ∈ V , u must not be in the top-k if pu(u) < Tl.
Proof. For the first case, suppose a node u with pl(u) ≥ Tu but not being selected in the top-k results, which means
a node must have default probability of at least pl(u) to be selected into the top-k result. Since Tu is the k-th largest
value in pu(v), it means there will be no more than k nodes that satisfy the condition. Therefore, the first case holds.
For the second case, since Tl is the k-th largest value of pl(v), which means P k must be at least Tl. Note that, P k is
default probability of the ranked k-th node in the the ground truth order. Therefore, the second case holds.
Algorithm 5: Reverse Sampling Algorithm
Input : Gt : a given network by reverse the direction each edge, B: candidate nodes
Output: hv: for each node v ∈ B in one sample
hv := 0 for all nodes v ∈ V ;1
for each node v in B do2
mark all nodes as unvisited ;3
Q ← {v} ;4
while Q 6= ∅ do5
u = Q.pop() ;6
if hu = 1 then7
hv := 1 and break ;8
if u is unchecked then9
generate a random number ru in [0, 1] ;10
mark u as checked ;11
if ru 6 ps(u) then12
hu := 1, hv := 1 and break ;13
for each u′ ∈ N(u) do14
if (u′, u) is unchecked then15
generate a random number to mark (u′, u) as survived or not ;16
mark u as visited ;17
for each u′ ∈ N(u) do18
if u′ is unvisited and (u′, u) is survived then19
push u′ into Q ;20
return hv for nodes in B21
Based on Lemma 1, Algorithm 4 shows the details of reducing candidate space. The algorithm takes the derived lower
and upper bounds as input and outputs the candidate nodes B and the number k′ of verified nodes. The verified k′ nodes
will be put into the result set directly. Note that, if we can verify k′ nodes based on the first pruning rule, then we only
need to find top-(k − k′) nodes from the candidate B. In this case, we reduce both the value k and n of Equation 3 to
k − k′ and |B|, respectively.
3.2.2 Reverse Sampling Approach
Based on Algorithm 4, we can greatly reduce the candidate space, which performance is verified in our experiments
on real-world datasets. In the basic sampling method, it aims to estimate the default probability for each node. Here,
we only need to compute the probability for the candidate nodes. Especially, when the candidate size is small, the
previous sampling method will explore a lot of unnecessary space. Intuitively, given a sampled possible world, for each
candidate node, we only need to verify if it can be reached by a node with hv = 1. Therefore, we can conduct a reverse
traverse from the candidate nodes to see if it can meet the criteria. The details are shown in Algorithm 5, where Gt is
the graph by reversing the direction of each edge in G. Note that, our reverse sampling method is different from the
reverse sampling framework used in influence maximization problem [?].
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The inputs are the graph Gt and candidate set B. After traverse a sample, it returns hv for each node v in B. At first,
we set hv = 0 for all the nodes. Then we conduct a breath first search from each node in the candidate set. For each
encountered node and edge, we mark it as checked and store the corresponding information (e.g., survived and hv) in
order to avoid generating random numbers for the same node/edge multiple times. The BFS terminates if it encounters
a node hv with hv = 1 or there is no more node to be explored (Lines 6-8). If it encounters a node with hv = 1, it
means the candidate node is influenced, and vice versa. Through this way, we can greatly reduce the computation cost
by filtering unnecessary searching space. Given sample size t, we repeat the process t times and cumulate the hv value
to estimate the default probability.
Reverse sampling based algorithm. By integrating the bounds based pruning method and the reverse sampling
technique, we have the reverse sampling based algorithm. It is easy to verify the approach is (, δ)-approximation if the
sample size fulfills Theorem 5. The proof details of Theorem 5 are omitted due to the space limitation.
Theorem 5. The reverse sampling based algorithm is (, δ)-approximation if the sample size is larger or equal than
t =
2
2
ln
(k − k′)(|B| − k + k′)
δ
(4)
3.3 Bottom-k Based Approach
Based on the lower and upper bounds derived, we can reduce the candidate space. In addition, by using the reverse
sampling technique, we can reduce the cost of exploring samples. The reverse sampling based algorithm can return a
result with tight theoretical guarantee, which reduces the sample size from Equation 3 to Equation 4. However, in many
real cases, the sample size and computation cost is still large. Intuitively, we only need sufficient samples to obtain a
competitive result. In this section, we derive a method based on bottom-k technique, which can greatly accelerate the
procedure with competitive top-k results.
3.3.1 Find the Top-1 Result
In the reverse sampling approach, when we process the samples one by one. We can terminate the processing, if there is
a node that has sufficient statistic. In this paper, we use bottom-k sketch to serve this role. The idea is that, we first
apply the lower and upper bound technique to obtain k′ and B. Let t be sample size computed by using Equation 4. We
assign each sample an id and generate a random hash value in (0, 1) for each of them. Since we does not materialize the
samples, the time complex of generating hash value is only O(t). We sort the samples in ascending order based on the
hash value, and materialize the samples accordingly by using the reverse sampling framework. For each node v in the
candidate set, we record a cumulated value vc. Based on Theorem 6, the node whose vc reaches bk first is the top-1
result. bk is the threshold preselected.
Theorem 6. The node selected by using the above procedure is the top-1 node.
Proof. Suppose node u is the first node that reaches the criteria and the hash value of its bk-th encountered sample is
hbk(u). According to the property of bottom-k sketch, we can estimate the default probability p(u) with bk−1
hbk(u)t
. If v
is the second node that reaches the criteria. We must have hbk(v) > hbk(u). Therefore, the corresponding estimated
value is smaller that of u. The theorem is correct.
Here, we use bk to measure if the statistic is sufficient or not. Even though the bottom-k based method does not often
tight theoretical guarantee as the previous approaches. Through our experimental evaluation, the bottom-k based
method shows great advantage compared with the others.
3.3.2 Find the Top-k Result
By extending Theorem 6, we can stop exploring the samples when there are k − k′ nodes with sufficient statistic, i.e.,
their counters reach bk. Note that, there may be case when the stop condition cannot be met after all the samples are
processed. Then the algorithm turns to the reverse based sampling method, and we just return the k − k′ nodes with
the largest estimated value. While, according to the experiments over real-world datasets, the algorithm can coverage
quickly with bk.
4 Experiment
In this section, we conduct extensive experiments to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed methods.
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Table 1: Details of experimental datasets
Datasets # Nodes # Edges Avg Deg. Max Deg.
Bitcoin 3,783 24,186 6.39 888
Facebook 4,039 88,234 21.85 1,045
Wiki 7,115 103,689 14.57 1,167
P2P 62,586 147,892 2.36 95
Citation 2,617 2,985 1.14 44
Interbank 125 249 1.99 47
Guarantee 31,309 35,987 1.15 14,362
Fraud 14,242 236,706 16.62 85,074
4.1 Experimental Settings
Datasets. We conduct the experiments on 3 real-world financial datasets, i.e., Interbank1, Fraud and Guarantee, and 5
public benchmark datasets with drastically varying sizes and characteristics. The statistic details are shown in Table 1.
Interbank networks is generated by the maximum-entropy (ME) approach [10], in which each node represents a bank
and edge corresponds to an interbank loan from the lender bank to the borrow bank. The dataset is public avaliable.
Fraud and Guarantee are our contributed datasets, which details are described as follows.
• Fraud. Credit card fraud networks with 19, 240 nodes and 34, 892 edges is constructed based on credit card
fraud transactions from a major commercial bank. Each edge represents a trade between the consumer and
merchant.
• Guarantee. The guaranteed loans network is from a major commercial bank spanning 4 years. The names of
the customers in the records are encrypted and replaced by IDs. We can access the guarantee relationships,
which denotes an edge between the guarantor to borrower. Besides, in case studies, we also get the basic
profile information such as the enterprise scale, and loan information such as the guarantee ID and the loan
credit.
Besides the real-world financial datasets, we also employ 5 benchmark datasets, which are pubic available. We download
Citation from network repository2. The others are downloaded from SNAP3.
Algorithms. We evaluate the following algorithms to demonstrate the performance of proposed techniques.
• N (Naive). Algorithm 1 with fixed sample size 3000.
• SN (Naive+Sample). Algorithm 1 with the sample size calculated by Equation 3.
• SR (Sample+Reverse). Algorithm that uses reverse sampling method with candidate set derived with second
rule of Lemma 1.
• BSR (Bound+Sample+Reverse). Optimized sampling method by integrating reverse sampling and bounds
filtering techniques with the sample size calculated by Equation 4.
• BSRBK (Bound+Sample+Reverse+Bottom-k). Bottom-k based method by integrating reverse sampling and
bounds filtering techniques.
Parameters and Workload. To evaluate the effectiveness of proposed techniques, the precision is reported. In the case
study, we directly observe labels from real-world behavior and validate the prediction result with the tagged labels. For
efficiency evaluation, the response time is reported.
For Fraud and Guarantee datasets, the self-risk and diffusion probability are obtained in our previous research [11, 6].
For the other datasets, the probability is randomly selected from [0, 1]. For parameter k, we vary it from 1%|V| to
10%|V|, where |V| is the corresponding graph node size. We set  = 0.3 and δ = 0.1 for computing the sample size.
1https://github.com/carloscinelli/NetworkRiskMeasures
2http://networkrepository.com/
3https://snap.stanford.edu/data/
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Figure 4: Parameter bk tuning for bottom-k based
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Figure 5: Parameter tuning for the order of bounds
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Figure 6: Efficiency evaluation
4.2 Parameter Tuning
In this section, we tune the parameters bk and the order of bounds on 4 datasets, i.e., Citation, Interbank, Fraud and
Guarantee.
Tuning bk. As analyzed in the paper, the precision of BSRBKshould converge rapidly with the increase of bk. We vary
bk from 4 to 64. The results are shown in Figure 4. Note that bk-X means bk is set to X . With the increase of bk, the
algorithm converges quickly for all the datasets. When the bk reaches 8, the drop of performance already becomes less
significant. Thus, in the following experiments, we set bk to 16.
Tuning Order of Bounds. Since the tightness of lower and upper bounds may greatly affect the sample size and
computation cost, we conduct the experiments to tune the order of bounds. We vary the order of bounds from 1 to 5 and
set k as 5% of the number of nodes. The candidate size is reported.
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Figure 7: Effectiveness evaluation
Figure 5 visualizes the result with heatmaps. The lighter the color is, the less number of candidates will be. As we can
see, the candidate size decreases rapidly at the beginning, and reach steady when the order reaches 2 for most cases.
Therefore, we set the order of upper and lower bounds to 2 for the following experiments.
4.3 Efficiency Evaluation
To demonstrate the efficiency of proposed techniques, we conduct experiments on all the datasets and report the
response time. The results are shown in Figure 6. In all methods, the computation time gradually increases along with k
except for the naive approach N, because N uses a large fixed sample size. For the other methods, the sample size may
change when k increases. As we can observe, algorithm N is the most time-consuming method, and the algorithm runs
faster when more accelerating techniques involved. SR is better than SN because the reverse sampling technique and
candidate set derived can greatly reduce the sampling cost. BSR is better than SR, since we can reduce the candidate
space and sample size by using the lower and upper bounds derived. BSRBKis better than BSR because of the novel
stop condition used. BSRBKalways outperforms the others and achieves up to 100x acceleration. These observations
strongly proves the advantage of proposed techniques.
4.4 Effectiveness Evaluation
To evaluate the effectiveness of proposed methods, the precision is reported by varying k from 1%|V| to 10%|V|. The
results are shown in Figure 7. Generally, the precision of the 5 methods is very close to each other, and the largest gap
between the naive method N and BSRBKis only 3%. Compared with the speedup in efficiency, the precision difference
is much less noticeable. The naive method N is slightly better than the other methods, because it has used more samples.
SN, SR and BSR report almost the same result, because they obtain the same theoretical guarantee. It should be noted
that for the Interbank dataset, 1%|V| = 1 and all methods successfully detect that node. Therefore, the precision is 1 as
shown in Figure 7(c). As observed, the experiment results prove that BSRBKcould achieve significant performance
acceleration while keeping a tolerable precision reduction.
5 Case Studies
In this section, we conduct the case studies by deploy our methods on a real-world loan management system. Firstly,
we compare the proposed methods with some previous used prediction methods over a real financial dataset. Then we
show how to discover risky paths and patterns by leveraging the vulnerable nodes identified as well as corresponding
case studies. Finally, we present the deployed system, which integrating the proposed techniques, and demonstrate the
performance over real scenarios.
To further demonstrate the performance of proposed methods, we compare the proposed methods with some baseline
approaches, which are designed for the default prediction task for real-world system. The baseline methods include
Wide [12], Wide and Deep [13], CNN-max [14], GBDT [15], crDNN [16], INDDP [6], HGAR [4]. We conduct the
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Table 2: Results of default prediction
AUC(2014) AUC(2015) AUC(2016)
Wide 0.75509 0.77751 0.78195
Wide & Deep 0.76464 0.79825 0.81053
GBDT 0.77263 0.80627 0.81182
CNN-max 0.77645 0.80049 0.81492
crDNN 0.77429 0.79565 0.81054
INDDP 0.79015 0.80927 0.81588
HGAR 0.81310 0.80988 0.81875
BSRBK 0.82367 0.82835 0.83709
BSR 0.82539∗∗ 0.83004∗∗ 0.83917∗∗
experiments over real-world dataset, i.e., Guarantee dataset, which spans 4 yeas, from 2012 to 2016. As observed, most
of the loans are repaid monthly. Hence, we aggregate the behavior features within one-month time window and mark
the delinquency loans as the target label for the month. The records of 2012 are used as the training data and then we
predict the defaults over the next three years. For the baseline methods, the training data is used to train the prediction
models. For our methods, the training data is used to train the probabilities involved in the networks, which details are
shown in our previous research [6].
The results are shown in Table 2, where AUC (Area Under the Curve) for each year is reported. As we can see, GBDT
and Wide & Deep outperform the Wide model, because of the increase of model capacity. INDDP and HGAR are
shown to be competitive across all the baselines. BSR and BSRBKsurpasses all the other approaches, which means the
graph structure and default diffusion properties are effective for default prediction tasks. BSR is slightly better than
BSRBK, because it can offer tight theoretical guarantee.
6 Related Work
In this section, we introduce related work on credit evaluation, diffusion in financial problems and probabilistic graphs.
6.1 Credit Evaluation
Consumer credit risk evaluation is often technically addressed in a data-driven fashion and has been extensively
investigated [17, 18]. Since the seminal “Partial Credit” model [19], numerous statistical approaches have been
introduced for credit scoring: logistic regression, k-NN, neural network, and support vector machine. More recently,
[17] presents an in-depth analysis on interpreting the learned knowledge embedded in neural networks by using
explanatory rules, and discusses how to visualize these rules. Researchers combine debt-to-income ratio with consumer
banking transactions and use a linear regression model with time-windowed dataset to predict the default rates in a
short future. They claim an 85% default prediction accuracy and can save costs of between 6% and 25% [20].
6.2 Diffusion in Finance
The relationship between network structure and financial system risk has been carefully studied and several insights
have been drawn. Network structure has little impact on system welfare, but it is important in determining systemic risk
and welfare in short-term debt [21]. Network theory attracts more attention after the 2008 global financial crisis. The
crisis brought about by Lehman Brothers infects connected corporations, which is similar to the 2002 Severe Acute
Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) epidemic. Both of them start from small damages, but hit a networked society and cause
serious events [22].
The dynamic network produced by bank overnight funds loans may be an alert of the crisis [23]. Moreover, research
that aims to understand individual behavior and interactions in the social network has also attracted extensive attention
[24, 25]. Although preliminary efforts have been made using network theory to understand fundamental problems in
financial systems [23, 26], there is little work on system risk analysis in networked-guarantee loans [27].
6.3 Probabilistic graph
The probabilistic (uncertain) graph, where each node or edge may appear with a certain probability, has been widely used
to model graphs with uncertainty in a wide spectrum of graph applications. A large number of classical graph problems
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have been studied in the context of probabilistic graphs. For instance, Jin et al. [28] investigate the distance-constraint
reachability problem in probabilistic graph. [29] introduces a framework to address the k nearest neighbors (kNN)
queries on probabilistic graphs. The problem of vulnerable nodes detection has been investigated in the context of
network reliability (e.g., [30, 31, 32]). Nevertheless, their models are inherently different with ours, and hence the
existing techniques cannot be trivially applied.
The problem investigated in this paper is similar to the study of node influence under the IC model [33] in the sense that
the influence of a node can be modeled by possible world semantics. Although a large body of works (e.g., [33, 34])
have been developed for the problem of influence maximization under the IC model, their proposed techniques cannot
be applied to our problem due to the inherent difference between the two problems. Firstly, the nodes in IC model do
not carry any probability. Secondly, their focus is to select k nodes such that the spread of influence is maximized.
While we aim to find k nodes with largest default probabilities.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we proposed a vulnerable SME detection system (VulnDS), which advocates the problem of top-k
vulnerable nodes detection to identify the k most risky enterprises evolved in the networked-guaranteed loans. In
particular, we propose a probabilistic guaranteed-loan network model to capture the contagion damage caused by
both self-risks of the nodes and the prorogation of defaults. Following the possible world semantics, we derive the
default probability of the nodes. As shown in the case study, this model significantly improves the accuracy of default
prediction on real-life guaranteed-loan networks. To tackle the efficiency and scalability issues in top-k vulnerable
nodes detection, effective pruning techniques and advanced sampling methods are proposed with rigorous theoretical
guarantee. To further accelerate the search, a bottom-k based approach is developed. Moreover, the proposed techniques
were integrated into a loan management system, which is deployed in our collaborated banks and further demonstrates
the effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed methods. The experimental result demonstrates that VulnDS is useful
in financial management for banks, regulatory authorities, and governments.
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